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THE KENTuciKy RuLa AGAiNsT PmPETU~rMs?
they are made, and they do not have to regain possession of the
car to assert their lien. The aggregate cost of all of these repairs
and work done might easily amount to more than the saleable
value of the car, and if this lien should be held to be superior
to a prior recorded mortgage lien, then, of course, the holder of
the note secured by the prior mortgage would have no security
for his debts. I cannot believe that this can be the law. In the
case of Rankin v. Scott, 12th Wheaton, 177, Chief Justice Mar-
shall said:
"A prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior satis-
faction out of the subject it binds, unless the lien be intrinsically de-
fective or displaced by some act of the party holding it, which shall
postpone him in a court of lower equity to a subsequent claimant."
There is no greater authority than Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall, and there is no doubt in my mind that his language states
the law, and I believe sound law. I am of the opinion, therefore,
that the lien of the garage company under the Acts of 1918 is
inferior to the lien of a prior valid recorded mortgage.
Ric-FrA C. STOLL,
Judge of the Fayette Circuit Court.
Lexington, Kentucky.
THE KENTUCKY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES?
Apparently the principle of stare decisis does not apply to
the interpretation of section 2360 of the Kentucky statutes. This
section provided that "the absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of a life or lives in
being at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years and ten
months thereafter."
In commenting upon this section and also upon a similar
section of the statutes of Iowa, Professor Gray asked the ques-
tion: "Is the statute provision a substitute for the common-law
rule, (as to perpetuities) or to be taken as an addition to it.''1
That question was asked a quarter of a century ago and we find
that our courts are still troubled by the same question and that
I The Rule Aganst Perpetuities (3rd ed.), Sections 736, 737.
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we are apparently no nearer a solution than when it was first
asked.
In Cammack v. Allen 2 in 1923 the Court of Appeals passed
upon the question and reached what the present writer respect-
fully submits was the right solution of the matter. It decided
that the section stated the Kentucky rule against perpeuities and
that the purpose was to forbid the vesting of titles beyond the
period stated. Counsel for the appellees in that case argued that
since the statute prohibited restraints on alienation beyond a life
or lives in being at the time of their creation and twenty-one
years and ten months it therefore by implication permitted the
suspension of such rights for the period of time specified in the
statute. The court rejected this view and said that the section
was but "declaratory of the common law rule and was intended
only as a statute against perpetuities and not one dealing with
the right of alienation by a person in whom the fee vested within
tb,. permissible period prescribed by it."
This view of the statute is in line with the cases that hold
that there can be a reasonable restraint on fee simple estates in
Kentucky and that the court will in each case determine what is
a resonable restraint,3 and furthermore it apparently is in har-
mony with the original purpose of the statute which was based
upon an early New York enactment, which in turn was based
upon the "erroneous conception," as Professor Gray points out,
"of the Rule against Perpetuities, that an alienable interest is
never too remote."
In the recent case of Perry v. Metcalf 4 the court rejected
the conclusion reached in Cammack v. Allen and now adopts
the position taken in a still earlier case, Saulsberry v. Sauls-
berry,q to the ifect that this section of the statutes fixed a limit
beyond which a restraint on alienation would be invalid. The
particular clause of the will under consideration in Perry v.
Metcalf provided that the devisees should not alienate the land
devised for a period of thirty years from December 1, 1913. As
already pointed out the court in this state, contrary to the gen-
eral rule of other jurisdictions allows a reasonable restraint on
2199 Ky. 268, 250 S. W. 963.
3 Chappell v. Frick Co., 166 Ky. 311, 179 S. W. 203.
'216 Ky. 755, 288 S. W. 694.
5140 Ky. 608, 131 S. W. 491.
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alienation of fee simple estate. It was held that a limitation that
land "in no way be disposed of, by deed or gift or sale by her
(the grantee), until she arrives at the age of thirty-five years,"
a reasonable restraint.6  And in Johnson v. Dumeyer 7 a pro-
viso that land should not be sold until twenty-eight years had
elapsed after the testator's death was held good. Since in that
case the court was willing to go so far as to hold a restraint for
twenty-eight years a reasonable time, it might well have gone so
far in Perry v. Metcalf as to extend the time two years longer,
or if it did not wish to extend the time two years it might have
limited the period of what is a reasonable time so as to hold the
restraint in Perry v. Metcalf bad. In either case it could have
left the decision in C(ammrack v. Allen intact. That would have
been in keeping with the view of the rule against perpetuities
taken by Professor Gray, which has now been pretty generally
adopted by the courts of this country.
W. LEwis RoBETs.
.Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush 723; Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263, 68
S. W. 131.
123 Ky. L. R. 2243.
